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This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public 
information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in 
the rational expectations tradition. Equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible 
allocations share similar properties to the market context (e.g., linear in information). The 
reason is that the market in general does not internalize the informational externality when 
public statistics (e.g., prices) convey information and does not balance optimally non-
fundamental volatility and the dispersion of actions. Under strategic substitutability, 
equilibrium prices will tend to convey too little information when the “informational” role of 
prices prevails over its “index of scarcity” role and too much information in the opposite case. 
Under strategic complementarity, prices always convey too little information. The welfare 
loss at the market solution may be increasing in the precision of private information. These 
results extend to the internal efficiency benchmark (accounting only for the collective welfare 
of the active players). Received results—on the relative weights placed by agents on private 
and public information, when the latter is exogenous—may be overturned. 
JEL-Code: D820, D830. 
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There has been a recent surge of interest in the welfare analysis of economies with 
private information and in particular on the role of public information in such 
economies (see, e.g., Morris and Shin 2002; Angeletos and Pavan 2007; Amador and 
Weill 2010). Agents may fail to place welfare-optimal weights on private and public 
information owing to payoff and information externalities. In this paper we examine 
the issue in a context where public information is endogenously generated and agents 
can condition on public statistics when making their choices. In the rational 
expectations tradition, agents learn from prices and from public statistics in general, 
which are themselves the aggregate outcome of individual decisions. 
 
Endogenous public information is relevant for a broad array of markets and situations. 
In financial markets, prices are noisy statistics that arise from the decisions of traders. 
In goods markets, prices aggregate information on the preferences of consumers and 
the quality of the products. In the overall economy, the release of GDP data is a noisy 
public signal that is the outcome of actions taken by economic agents.1 
 
Any welfare analysis of rational expectations equilibria faces several difficulties. First 
of all, it must employ a model capable of dealing in a tractable way with the dual role 
of prices as conveyors of information and determinants of traders’ budget constraints. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) were pioneers in this respect with their CARA-normal 
model. Second, we require a welfare benchmark against which to test market 
equilibria in a world with asymmetric information. The appropriate benchmark for 
measuring inefficiency at the market equilibrium is the team solution in which agents 
internalize collective welfare but must still rely on private information when making 
their own decisions (Radner 1979; Vives 1988; Angeletos and Pavan 2007). This is in 
the spirit of Hayek (1945), where the private signals of agents cannot be 
communicated to a center. The team-efficient solution internalizes the payoff and 
information externalities associated with the actions of agents in the market. 
Collective welfare may refer to the surplus of all market participants, active or passive, 
or may be restricted to the internal welfare of the active agents. The third challenge 
for such welfare analysis is dealing with the interaction of payoff and informational 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Rodríguez-Mora and Schulstad (2007). externalities. If we take as a benchmark a pure prediction model with no payoff 
externalities, then agents will typically rely too much on public information. The 
reason is that agents do not take into account that their reaction to private information 
affects the informativeness of public statistics and general welfare. In other words, 
agents do not internalize an information externality. Pure information externalities 
will make agents insufficiently responsive to their private information (Vives 1993, 
1997; Amador and Weill 2011). We will see that payoff externalities complicate 
welfare analysis and may rebalance weightings in the opposite direction. 
 
In this paper we consider a tractable linear-quadratic-Gaussian model that allows us to 
address the three challenges just described when public information is endogenously 
generated and influenced by the actions of agents. There is uncertainty about a 
common valuation parameter about which agents have private information, and the 
endogenous public statistic or “price” is noisy. We use a model with a rational 
expectations flavor but in the context of a well-specified game, where a continuum of 
agents compete in schedules, and allow actions to be strategic substitutes or 
complements. We focus our attention on linear Bayesian equilibria. The model is 
flexible and admits several interpretations in terms of firms competing in a 
homogenous product market, investment complementarities, monopolistic 
competition, traders (both rational and “behavioral”) in a financial market, and asset 
auctions. 
 
We show that agents correct the slope of their strategy according to what they learn 
from the public statistic and the character of competition. Under strategic substitutes 
competition the price’s informational and index-of-scarcity roles conflict. With 
strategic substitutes and private information, a high price is bad news and the 
equilibrium schedule is steeper than with full information. In fact, in equilibrium 
schedules may slope the “wrong” way (e.g., downward for a supply schedule) when 
the informational role of prices dominates their index-of-scarcity role. This will occur 
when there is little noise in the public statistic. With strategic complements there is no 
conflict: a high price is good news, and the equilibrium schedule is flatter than with 
full information.  
 
  3It is interesting that the impact on the slope of the equilibrium schedule of a change in 
the exogenous (prior) precision of public information is opposite to the change in the 
precision of the noise in the endogenous public signal; consequently, market depth is 
increasing in the former and decreasing in the latter. The reason is that an increase in 
the exogenous precision of public information decreases the informational component 
of the public statistic whereas an increase in the endogenous precision increases it. 
Furthermore, an increase in the degree of the game’s complementarity will increase 
the response to private information and the dispersion of actions under strategic 
complements. The opposite results obtain under strategic substitutes. 
 
Consider the collective welfare benchmark and an economy in which not only the full 
information equilibrium is efficient but also the equilibrium with private information 
when public information is exogenous (this is as in Vives 1988 or Section 5.3 in 
Angeletos and Pavan 2007). We show that market equilibria will not be team-efficient 
even when the allowed allocations have properties (e.g., being linear in information) 
similar to those of the market equilibrium. This is because the market in general does 
not internalize the informational externality that results from public statistics (e.g., 
prices) conveying information. Indeed, a competitive agent is an information taker 
while the precision of the public statistic is endogenous. The market equilibrium is 
characterized by the privately efficient use of private information. Team efficiency 
instead makes socially efficient use of private information. Market equilibria will be 
team-efficient only in exceptional circumstances (as when the information externality 
vanishes). This occurs, for example, when public information is exogenous. We find 
that, under strategic substitutability, equilibrium prices will tend to convey too little 
information when the informational role of prices prevails and too much information 
when its index-of-scarcity role prevails. At the boundary of those situations there is a 
knife-edge case where parameters are such that agents use vertical schedules (as in a 
Cournot game), non contingent on the price (public statistic), and therefore the 
information externality disappears. In this particular case constrained efficiency is 
restored. Under strategic complementarity, prices always convey too little information.  
 
The intuition of the results is as follows. Consider a homogenous product market with 
random demand and a continuum of firms competing in supply schedules with 
increasing and symmetric marginal costs with uncertain intercept. Each firm receives 
  4a private signal on the marginal cost intercept and this induces both allocative and 
productive inefficiency. Allocative inefficiency refers to a distorted total output and 
productive inefficiency refers to a distorted distribution of a given total output. The 
equilibrium in the complete information economy is efficient since it is competitive. 
In this equilibrium all firms produce the same amount since they all have full 
information on costs, which are symmetric. The team-efficient solution in an 
economy with asymmetric information optimally trades off the tension between the 
two sources of welfare loss, allocative and productive inefficiency, when firms 
respond to private information. Allocative inefficiency is proportional to non-
fundamental price volatility and productive inefficiency to the dispersion of individual 
actions. We can see, therefore, the team-efficient solution trading off both sources of 
welfare loss. We have that a higher response to private information makes prices more 
informative and reduces allocative inefficiency (since the total quantity is closer to the 
full information first best), as well as non-fundamental price volatility, but at the same 
time the dispersion of quantities increases and with it productive inefficiency. The 
somewhat surprising possibility that prices are too informative arises then since at the 
market solution firms may respond excessively to private information generating too 
much productive inefficiency. In this case there is too little non-fundamental price 
volatility. This happens under strategic substitutability, when the dual role of prices 
conflict, if the index of scarcity role of prices dominates the information role. When 
this does not happen and prices convey too little information, which is always the case 
with strategic complementarity, then there is excessive volatility at the market 
solution. 
 
More precise information, be it public or private, reduces the welfare loss at the team-
efficient solution. The reason is that the direct impact of the increased precisions is to 
decrease the welfare loss and this is the whole effect since at the team-efficient 
solution the response to private and public information are already (socially) 
optimized. In contrast, at the market solution an increase in, say, the precision of  
private information will increase the response of an agent to his private signal and this 
will tend to increase the welfare loss when the market calls already for a too large 
response to private information. If this indirect effect is strong enough the welfare loss 
may be increasing with the precision of private information. In principle the same 
  5effect could happen with the precision of public information but we can show that the 
indirect effect of changes in both the exogenous public precision of information and 
the precision of the noise in the endogenous public signal are always dominated by 
the direct effect. The result is that the welfare loss at the market solution is always 
decreasing with the precisions of public information. 
 
Recent literature has examined the circumstances under which more public 
information actually reduces welfare (as in Burguet and Vives 2000; Morris and Shin 
2002; Angeletos and Pavan 2007; Amador and Weill 2010, 2011). In Burguet and 
Vives (2000) a higher (exogenous) public precision may discourage private 
information acquisition and lead to a higher welfare loss in a purely informational 
externality model. In Morris and Shin (2002) the result is driven by a socially 
excessive incentive to coordinate by agents. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) qualify this 
result and relate it to the payoff externalities present in a more general model. In 
Amador and Weill (2010) a public release of information reduces the informational 
efficiency of prices and this effect may dominate the direct information provision 
effect. Their model is purely driven by information externalities in the presence of 
strategic complementarities in terms of responses to private information.2 In our 
model more public information is not damaging welfare but more private precision 
may be. This happens when at the market solution there is already too much 
dispersion of actions and an increase in private precision exacerbates the problem. 
 
The results can be extended to the internal team-efficient benchmark (where only the 
collective welfare of the players is taken into account, for example, ignoring passive 
consumers). In this case also, endogenous public information may overturn 
conclusions reached using exogenous information models (e.g., Angeletos and Pavan 
2007) when the informational role of the price is in conflict and dominates its index of 
scarcity role. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the leading 
interpretation of firms competing in a homogenous product market. Section 3 
characterizes the equilibrium and Section 4 its comparative statics properties and the 
                                                 
2   Ganguli and Yang (2009) develop the implications of strategic complementarities for information 
acquisition in noisy rational expectations models. 
  6value of information. Section 5 performs a welfare analysis, and Section 6 studies the 
internal team-efficient benchmark. Section 7 presents alternative interpretations of the 




2. The model 
Consider a quadratic payoff game with a continuum of players indexed within the 




ii i i x xu x x x x

        , 
where  i x  is the individual action of the player, 
1
0 i x xd i    is the aggregate action,   
and u  are parameters that, for the moment, are simply given, and  ,   are positive 
parameters. Then  
2 2 0 i x       and 
2
i xx       , and the slope of the best 




i x x mx            . Thus we have strategic 
substitutability (complementarity) for  0    (for  0   ), and   can be understood as 
the degree of complementarity in the payoffs. (In the rest of this paper, when 
discussing strategic substitutability or complementarity we refer to this meaning in the 
context of this certainty game). We assume that 
m
1 m 2   or 20    
0
, limiting the 
extent of strategic complementarity. The condition 2      guarantees  that 
 ,  x x   is strictly concave in x (   2  
2 2 x  0     
0
 ). Observe that there are 
no payoff externalities among players when   . 
 
Consider now a game with uncertainty and in which   and    are random. The 
parameter 
u
   is uncertain; it has prior Gaussian distribution with mean   and 
variance 
2
   (we  write  
2 ~, N       and, to ease notation, set  0   ). Player i 
receives a signal  ii s    with  
2 ~0 , i N    . Error terms are uncorrelated across 
players, and the random variables   i ,, u   are mutually independent. We establish 
the convention that error terms cancel in the aggregate: 
1
i 
0 di 0    almost surely (a.s.). 
  7Then the aggregation of all individual signals will reveal the underlying 
uncertainty:
11
00 ii sd i      .3 
 
Players have access to the (endogenous) public statistic p ux     , where 
 ~0 , uN 
2
u  ; this can be interpreted as the marginal benefit of taking action level  i x , 
which has cost 
2 2 ii x x   .4 When  0   , there are no informational externalities 
among players.  
 
The payoff to player i can be written as 
2
2
ii ii pxx x

   
where  p  is the public statistic, and the dual role of   as both a parameter in the 
payoff function and in the public statistic should be noted. This situation arises 
naturally in the applications. 
 
The timing of the game is as follows. At  0 t  , the random variables   and u  are 
drawn but not observed. At  , each player observes his own private signal   and 




 , ii X s   with    , i ii x Xs  p , where p  is the public statistic. The 
strategy of a player is a map from the signal space to the space of schedules. Finally, 
the public statistic is formed (the “market clears”) by finding a p  that  solves 
 , jj  
1
0 p uX     s p d j , and payoffs are collected at  1 t  . 
                                                 
3  That is, I assume that the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) holds for a continuum of 
independent random variables with uniformly bounded variances. Suppose that   is  a 
process of independent random variables with means 
 0,1 i i q

  i Eq  and uniformly bounded variances 
  var
i q . Then we let   a.s. This convention will be used while taking as given 
the usual linearity property of integrals. Equality of random variables must be assumed to hold 
almost surely. It can be checked that the results obtained in the continuum economy are the limit of 
finite economies under the usual SLLN. 

11
00 i qd i Eq d i   i
4  Normality of random variables means that prices and quantities can be negative with positive 
probability. The probability of this event can be controlled, if necessary, by an appropriate choice 
of means and variances. Furthermore, for this analysis the key property of Gaussian distributions is 
that conditional expectations are linear. Other prior-likelihood conjugate pairs (e.g., beta-binomial 
and gamma-Poisson) share this linearity property and can display bounded supports. 
  8Let us assume that there is a unique public statistic       01 jj j, ˆ pXs ,
   for  any 
realization of the signals. 5 Then, for a given profile       01 jj j, Xs ,
 
i
 of  players’ 




ii i p xx

   , 
where   , ii i x Xsp  ,   
1
0 , jj x Xsp d j   , and     0,1





formulation has a rational expectations flavor but in the context of a well-specified 
schedule game. We will restrict our attention to linear Bayesian equilibria of the 
schedule game. The model admits several interpretations and we present below the 
leading one linking supply function competition and rational expectations (see Section 
6 for the other interpretations).6 
 
Firms competing in a homogenous product market with quadratic production costs.  
In this case, p ux     is the inverse demand for the homogenous product,  i x  is 
the output of firm i, and the cost function of firm i is given by  
2 () 2 ii i x x   Cx . 
Firms use supply functions as strategies, and markets clear: 
 
1
0 , ii  p uX s p  d i
i
   . Costs are random and firm i has a noisy estimate of 
the intercept of marginal cost  i s     at the time of submitting the supply function. 
If  0   , then demand is downward sloping and we have strategic substitutability in 
the usual partial equilibrium market. If  0   , we have strategic complementarity and 
demand is upward sloping. The latter situation may arise in the case of a network 
good with compatibility. 
 
We will maintain a supply interpretation of the model up to Section 6. We let 
p ux   
MC( ) i
  be the marginal benefit or “price” of taking an action and let 
i x x     be the marginal cost. 
                                                 
5  We assign zero payoffs to the players if there is no   that solves the fixed point problem. If there 
are multiple solutions, then the one that maximizes volume is chosen. 
p
6    See Chapter 3 in Vives (2008) for an overview of the connection between supply function 
competition and rational expectations models, as well as examples. 
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3. Equilibrium 
We are interested in a linear (Bayesian) equilibrium—equilibrium, for short—of the 
schedule game for which the public statistic functional is of type  . Since the 
payoffs and the information structure are symmetrical and since payoffs are strictly 
concave, there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to symmetric 
equilibria. Indeed, the solution to the problem of player i, 
 , u  
max ,
2
i xi Ep xx s p

 i i
         
, 
is both unique (given strict concavity of profits) and symmetric across players (since 
the cost function and signal structure are symmetric across firms): 
   
1 ,, ii X sp pE sp 
      , 
where   ,   p u   . A strategy for player i may be written as 
ˆ ˆ , ii x bc pa s    
in which case the aggregate action is given by 
1
0
ˆ ˆ i x xd i b c p a       . 
It then follows from  p ux     that, provided 
1 ˆ c 
  , 
    
1 ˆ ˆ , 1 p ucb    

  z 
u
; 
here the random variable za     is informationally equivalent to the “price” or 
public statistic p . Because u is random, z  (and the public statistic) will typically 
generate a noisy signal of the unknown parameter  . 
 
Market depth—that is, the inverse of how much the price moves to accommodate a 
unit increase in u—is given by 
1 ˆ 1 uc  
    .7 Excess demand is given by 
  
1 ˆ ˆ p up ba c p   
      . 
The information available to player i  is    , i sp or,  equivalently,    , i sz. Since 
, i Es pEs z       , i  
                                                
, we can posit strategies of the form 
 
7  See, for example, Kyle (1985). 
  10  , ii X sz ba s c z    
and obtain that    1 p bc     z 0 . If  ˆ 1 c     then  1 0 c    (since  

1 1 ˆ cc 
   and 
1 ˆ 11 cc 

  ) and so p  and  z   will move together. The 
strategy of player i is then given by 
    
1 ,1 ii , X sz b c zE sz   
         . 
 
We can solve for the LE in the usual way: identifying coefficients with the candidate 
linear strategy  ii x ba s c z   by  calculating , i E sz        and using the supply 
function of a player. 
 
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1. Let  0     and  0 u   . Then there is a unique (and symmetric) 
equilibrium 
   
1 ,, ii X sp pE sp 
     
ˆ ˆ i ba s c p  , 
where   is the unique (real) solution of the equation  a  
1 12
u aa      
2     , 
   
1 1 21 ˆ 1 u ca       
      , and      ˆ ˆ 1 bc      . In equilibrium, 
 and 10  
1 1 0, a     
   ˆ c   . 
 
Remark 1. We have examined linear equilibria of the schedule game for which the 
public statistic function is of type    , u  . In fact, these are the equilibria in 
strategies with bounded means and with uniformly (across players) bounded variances. 
(See Claim 1 in the Appendix.) 
 
Remark 2. We can show that the equilibrium in the continuum economy is the limit of 
equilibria in replica economies that approach the limit economy. Take the 
homogenous market interpretation with a finite number of firms n  and  inverse 
demand  nn p ux     , where  n x   is the average output per firm, and with the same 
informational assumptions. In this case, given the results in Section 5.2 of Vives 
  11(2011), the supply function equilibrium of the finite n-replica market converges to 
the equilibrium in Proposition 1. 
 
The public statistic or price serves a dual role as index of scarcity and conveyor of 
information. Indeed, a high price has the direct effect of increasing an agent’s 
competitive supply, but it also conveys news about costs—namely, that costs are high 
(low) if  0    (0   ). In equilibrium, the “price impact” (or inverse of the depth of 
the market) is always positive,  
1 10 ˆ Pu c 
     , and excess demand is 
downward or upward sloping depending on  :   or  
1 ˆ ´c 
  
    sgn ´ sgn     . That is, the slope’s direction depends on whether the 
competition is in strategic substitutes or in strategic complements. 
 




  , as 
given and use it to form probabilistic beliefs about the underlying uncertain parameter 
 . We have that        1 ii E| s , z s z     E|   with  
1
    
  . Revised 
beliefs and optimization, in turn, determine the coefficients a and c for private and 
public information, respectively. In equilibrium, the informativeness of public 
information  z   depends on the sensitivity of strategies to private information 
:  . Agents behave as information takers and so, from the perspective 
of an individual agent, public information is exogenous. This fact is at the root of the 
equilibrium’s informational externality.  That is, agents fail to account for the impact 
of their own actions on public information and hence on other agents. 
a
22 a    u  
 
Consider as a benchmark the full information case with perfectly informative signals 
(   
c
). This puts us in a full information competitive equilibrium and we have 

1  
  , 
1 ˆ   ac 
  , and     
1 , Xp p  
    . In this case, agents have 
nothing to learn from the price. If signals become noisy (    ) then 
1 a 
   and 
1 ˆ c 
   for  0   , with supply functions becoming steeper (lower  ) as agents 
protect themselves from adverse selection. The opposite happens (
ˆ c
1 ˆ c 
   and flatter 
  12supply functions) when  0  
ˆ =  c
, since then a high price is good news (entailing lower 
costs). 8 There is then “favorable” selection. 
 
Two other cases in which 
1 
  and there is no learning from the price are when 
signals are uninformative about the common parameter      0      and when the 
public statistic is extremely noisy ( 0 u   ). In the first case, the price has no 
information to convey; a  and      0    
1 , i Xs p p  
  

. In the second case, public 
information is pure noise,      
1 1 
   , with    
1 , a ii X sp pE s 
     .9 
In all three cases, there is no information externality via the public statistic. 
 
As  u  tends to ∞, the precision of prices  also tends to ∞, the weight given to 
private information a  tends to 0 , and the equilibrium collapses (with  ˆ 10 c   ). 
Indeed, the equilibrium becomes fully revealing and is not implementable. 
 
 
4. Comparative statics and the value of information 
This section studies the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium and how the 
weights and the responses to public and private information vary with underlying 
parameters. The following proposition presents a first set of results. The effects of 
changes in the degree of complementarity are dealt with afterwards. 
 
Proposition 2. Let   0     and  0 u   . In equilibrium, the following statements hold. 
(i)  Responsiveness to private information a decreases from  




    
  
  ranges from 0 to ∞, decreases with    ,    and  , and increases with 
  .  
                                                 
8  This follows because, with upward-sloping demand, we assume that 20     and 
therefore   . 
9  The same happens when  0   (in which case there is no payoff externality, either). 
  13(ii)  Responsiveness to the public statistic  ˆ c goes from 
1 
  to 
1 
   as  u   ranges 
from 0 to ∞. Furthermore,       ˆˆ sgn cc  sgn sgn u          and 
    
22 ˆ sgn sgn 4 u c           
2 2      . Market depth  ˆ 1 c    is 
decreasing in  u   and increasing in    . 
(iii)  Price informativeness   is increasing in   ,  u   ,     and    , and decreasing 
in . 
(iv)  Dispersion       decreases with u 
2
i Exx 
  ,     ,   and  .  
 
How the equilibrium weights to private and public information vary with the deep 
parameters of the model help to explain the results. We have that 
  ii E| s , z sh z     where    
1
u ha   
  . Identify the informational 
component of the price with the weight  h  on  public  information  z , with 
    sgn sgn h   . When  0    there is adverse selection (a high price is bad news 
about costs) and   while when  0 h  0   ,  0 h   and there is favorable selection (a 
high price is good news). We have that      sgn h sgn    . As   is decreased 
from  0     adverse selection is lessened, and when  0     we have favorable 
selection with   and  0 h  0  h   . The result is that an increase in    increases 
the public precision10  and decreases the response to private information. We have 
also that increasing the precision of the prior decreases the informational component 
of the price,  0  h    , while that increasing the precision of the noise in the price 
increases it,  0  u h   . (See Claim 2 in the Appendix.) The effect of     is 
ambiguous.  
 
In order to gain further intuition from these results, we first consider the case  0   . 
As  u   increases from  ,   decreases from  0 ˆ c
1 
  (and the slope of supply increases) 
because of the price’s increased informational component  . Agents are more  0 h 
                                                 
10   An increase in    has a direct positive effect on   and an indirect  negative effect via the induced 
change in a . The direct effect prevails. Note that changing    modifies not only the public statistic 
p  but also the degree of complementarity in the payoff. 
  14cautious when seeing a high price because it may mean higher costs. As  u   increases 




  .11 At the point where the scarcity and informational effects balance, 
agents place zero weight ( ) on the public statistic. In this case, agents do not 
condition on the price and the model reduces to a quantity-setting model à la Cournot 
(however, not reacting to the price is optimal). If 
ˆ 0 c 
   increases then the informational 
component of the price diminishes since the agents are now endowed with better prior 
information, and induces a higher   (and a more elastic supply). An increase in the 
precision of private information 
ˆ c
    always increases responsiveness to the private 
signal but has an ambiguous effect on the slope of supply. The parameter   is U-
shaped with respect to 
ˆ c
  . Observe that 
1 ˆ c 
   not only when       but also when 
0     and  that 
1 ˆ c 
   for     0,    . If      is high, then a further increase in     
(less noise in the signals) lowers adverse selection (and h) and increases  . If  ˆ c    is 
low then the price is relatively uninformative, and an increase in     increases adverse 




If   then a high price conveys goods news in terms of both scarcity effects and 
informational effects, so supply is always upward sloping in this case. Indeed, when 
1 ˆ c 
     we have  . A high price conveys the good news that average quantity 
tends to be high and that costs therefore tend to be low ( 0 h  ).  In this case, 
increasing  u  , which reinforces the informational component of the price, increases 
—the opposite of what happens when  ˆ c    increases. An increase in the precision of 
private information     increases responsiveness to the private signal but, as before, 
has an ambiguous effect on the slope of supply. Now the parameter   is hump-shaped 
with respect to 
ˆ c
   
1 ˆ c 
   and 
1 ˆ c  because   for  0,     
   in the extremes of the 
interval  .   0,
 
                                                 
11  See Wilson (1979) for a model in which adverse selection makes demand schedules upward 
sloping. 
  15In either case ( 0   or 0   ) market depth 
1 ˆ 1 uc  
     is decreasing in  u   
and increasing in    .12  
 
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics results on the equilibrium strategy. 
 
Table 1: Comparative Statics on the Equilibrium Strategy 
sgn  u              
a          
ˆ c              
22 2 4 u           
 
 
The degree of complementarity m      depends  on     for a fixed   (it  makes 
sense to keep   fixed since   also affects the public statistic p ux    ). For 
fixed   we have that      sgn sgn m    . From Proposition 2 we have then that 
    sgn am sgn     ,      sgn sgn m    , and 
     
2 sgn n sgn i mE x x m sg             . The results are summarized in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Effects of a Change in the Degree of Complementarity (  fixed) 
sgn  a            
2
i E xx        
m                  
 
 
Increased reliance on public information as complementarity increases is a general 
theme in the work of Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007) when 
public signals are exogenous. In stylized environments more complementarity 
increases the value of public information in forecasting aggregate behavior and 
decreases the dispersion of actions (e.g., Cor. 1 in Angeletos and Pavan 2007). In our 
                                                 
12   It can also be checked that when  0    market depth is increasing with  . 
  16model this happens in the strategic substitutes case ( 0   ). With strategic 
complements ( 0   ) an increase in   (a lower  m  ) makes agents rely less on private 
information (  decreases) but respond more to private information (  increases), and 
increases dispersion as well as increases the precision of public information. (See 




5. Welfare analysis 
Consider the homogeneous product market with quadratic production costs. The 
inverse demand p ux       arises from a benefit or surplus function 








         
  





Under our assumptions,  0     and the TS function is strictly concave for 
symmetric solutions. 
 
The equilibrium is partially revealing (with 0 u    and 0    ), so expected 
total surplus should be strictly greater in the first-best allocation (full information) 
 
1 o x  u   
   , which is just the market solution with full information, 
than at the LE. The reason is that suppliers produce under uncertainty and rely on 
imperfect idiosyncratic estimation of the common cost component; hence they end up 
producing different amounts even though costs are identical and strictly convex. 
However, since producers are competitive they produce in expected value the right 
amount at the equilibrium:     
1 o Ex Ex  
    . 
 
The welfare benchmark that we use is the team solution maximizing expected total 
surplus subject to employing linear decentralized strategies (as in Vives 1988; 
Angeletos and Pavan 2007). This team-efficient solution internalizes the information 
externalities of the actions of agents, and it is restricted to using the same type of 
strategies (decentralized and linear) that the market employs. Indeed, when reacting to 
information, an agent in the market does not take into account the influence her own 
actions have on public statistics. 
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It is worth noting that in the economy considered if firms would not condition on 
prices, i.e. if each firm would set quantities conditioning only on its private 
information, then the market solution would be team-efficient (Vives 1988). This will 
not be the case in general when public information is endogenous because of 
information externalities.  
 
At the team-efficient solution, expected total surplus    TS E  is maximized under the 
constraint that firms use decentralized linear production strategies. That is, 
 
,, max TS
abc E  
subject to     ii x ba s c z   ,   x ba c z     ,  and  zu a     . 
 
Equivalently, the team-efficient solution minimizes, over the restricted strategies, the 
expected welfare loss WL with respect to the full information first best. It is possible 
to show that  
   
2 2 WL 2
o
i Exx Exx           
 , 
where the first term in the sum corresponds to allocative inefficiency (how distorted is 
the average quantity x    while producing in a cost-minimizing way), which is 
proportional to   
2
x
o Ex       
 , and the second term to productive inefficiency (how 
distorted is the distribution of production of a given average quantity x ), which is 
proportional to the dispersion of outputs  
2
i Exx       . Let 
o p  be the full information 
first best price. Note that the non-fundamental price volatility is given 
by    and therefore it is proportional to allocative 
inefficiency. 
  Epp x  







It is easily seen that the form of the optimal team strategy is 
   
1 1| ii  x ps Ez  
        where the weight to private information  a     
may differ from the market weight. Note that both in the market and the team 
solutions we have that  a    . It follows then that the welfare loss at any candidate 
  18team solution will depend only on the response to private information a  since we 
have     
2 22 1
o Exx a         
 ,  ,  and 
22
u a     

2 2
i Exx a       . This yields a strictly convex WL as a function of  . Changing 
  has opposite effects on both sources of the welfare loss since allocative   
inefficiency decreases with a , as price informativeness
a
a
 increases and the average 
quantity gets close to the full information allocation,  but productive inefficiency 
increases with aas dispersion increases. Note that a more informative price reduces 
allocative inefficiency and non-fundamental price volatility but increases productive 
inefficiency. The team solution optimally trades them off among decentralized 
strategies.  
 
If there was no information externality a   would not affect  (which would be 
exogenous). In this case it is easy to see that the team and the market solution 
coincide with  
1 1
     a 
   . Otherwise there is an information externality and 
the market is inefficient.  
 
The sign of the information externality can be found easily by breaking down the  
impact of the sensitivity to private information a  on    TS E   between the market 
effect, where the public statistic z is taken as given, and the information externality 
effect (IE), where the impact on   is taken into account.   z
 









             MC
ii
ii p x   x           
. 
         

 
The market term is null at the market solution (denoted *) and the IE term can be 
evaluated as follows: 
 
    * c  
*
TS
sgn sgn IE sgn
aa 






  19The sign of the informational externality depends on whether we have strategic 
substitutes or complements competition and on whether supply slopes upwards or 
downwards. If  0    there is adverse selection and a high price indicates high costs. 
If supply is upward sloping ( ) and, say, costs are high ( *0 c  0    ) then an 








) while     MC i p x   will 
tend to be low (since at the market solution      MC 0 i Ep x     
i
). This 
means that IE  and  that    must be reduced. If supply is downward sloping 
( ) in the same situation an increase in a  will decrease 
0  a
*0 c  x , which is welfare 
enhancing. The same will happen if  0    since then   and an increase in   will 
decrease 
*0 c  a
i x . In the last two situations   and   must be increased.  IE  0 a
 
The following proposition characterizes the response to private information at the 
team solution (superscript T) and compares it with the equilibrium solution 
(superscript *). 
 
Proposition 3. Let  0   





     sg sgn *
T aa c   n * . 
 
If 0    then there no informational externality, and the team and market solutions 
coincide. For  0   , 0    , and  , the solutions coincide only if  . This 
occurs only at the equilibrium 
0 u   *0 c 
    a           (with 0  
* c
). When firms do 
not respond to the price  , the model reduces to a quantity-setting model with 
private information. This is consistent with Vives (1988), where it is shown that a 
Cournot market with private information and a continuum of suppliers solves a team 
problem whose objective function is expected total surplus. If 
 0 c 
0   then   should 




At the equilibrium with strategic substitutability, for which  0   , and since then   
is decreasing in 
* c
u  , there is too much (not enough) weight given to private 
  20information whenever  u    is small (large) and supply functions are increasing 
(decreasing). In the second case the market displays too much allocative inefficiency 
(the price contains too little information); in the first too little, the price is too 
informative, and there is too much productive inefficiency. With strategic 
complementarity ( 0   ) we have that both   and  *0 c 
      sgn TS sgn 0 Ea c    *    always, agents give insufficient weight to private 
information and the market displays too much allocative inefficiency. 
 
There is no information externality when firms have perfect information (   ) and 
the full information, first-best outcome (price equal to marginal cost) is obtained; 
when the price contains no information ( 0 u   ); or when signals are uninformative 
(0   

). In each of these cases, the team and the market solution coincide in terms of 
 TS E . For both the team and the market solutions    1 c    , if  0 u    
then   TS E  is infinite; if  0    , then a 0  . The case  0 u   is akin to the case with 
exogenous public information where the market allocation is constrained efficient 
(Vives (1988), Angeletos and Pavan (2007)). Constrained efficiency no longer holds 
when the information externality is present. 
 
The conclusion is that, with strategic substitutability, team efficiency requires a 
decrease (increase) in c  when    is negative (positive). When  , the 
informational role of the price dominates and the price reveals too little information. 
In this case, more weight should be given to private signals so that public information 
becomes more revealing to reduce allocative inefficiency. Conversely, when the price 
is mainly an index of scarcity, c , it reveals too much information and a should 
be decreased to reduce excessive dispersion. Only in the knife-edge (Cournot) case, 
where  , is the equilibrium team-efficient. With strategic complementarity, 
agents place too little weight on private information. When 
* c
0 
* c  0
*
*0 c 
0   , the informational 
externality is aligned with the price scarcity effect; in this case, it is always preferable 
to induce agents to rely more on their private information to reduce allocative 
inefficiency. 
 
  21Remark 3. If the signals of agents can be communicated to a center, then questions 
arise concerning the incentives to reveal information and how welfare allocations may 
be modified. This issue is analyzed in a related model by Messner and Vives (2006), 
who use a mechanism design approach along the lines of Laffont (1985). 
 
The question arises as of how the welfare loss WL at the market solution depends on 
information precisions    , u   and    .  We know that WL at  a linear allocation as a 


















It is immediate then that at the team-efficient solution   
T WL a   is decreasing in 
  , u   and    . This is so since WL is decreasing in    , u   and     for a  given a and 










'   WL' a* 
u
0 depending on whether   or  . Since 
 is decreasing in 
T a* a 
T a a*
a*   and    , and increasing in     we have thus that WL  is 
decreasing in 
 a*
u   and     when   and  in 
T a a*    when 
T a* a  . It is possible in 
principle that increasing precisions of public information  u   and     increases  the 
welfare loss when    when the direct effect of the increase of 
T a* a  u   or     is 
dominated by the indirect effect via the induced decrease in a* (and similarly for an 
increase in     when  ). We can check, however, that WL  is  always 
decreasing in 
T a* a   * a
   and  u  because the direct effect always dominates the indirect effect. 
This need not be the case when changing    . 
 
Proposition 4. The welfare loss at the team-efficient solution is decreasing in    , u   
and    . The welfare loss at the market solution is also decreasing in     and  u   and it 
may be decreasing or increasing in     (it will be increasing for     and       or 
u   small enough). 
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5. Internal welfare benchmark 
A different benchmark is provided by the collective welfare of the players, the 
producers in our example. At the internal team–efficient solution, expected average 
profit    E    (where   and 
1
0 i di       
2 2 ii ux x x         i ) is maximized 
under the constraint that agents use decentralized linear strategies. Since the solution 
is symmetric we have that      i E E     . This is the cooperative solution from the 
players’ perspective. That is, 
 
,, max i abc E   
subject to     ii x ba s c z   ,   x ba c z     ,  and  zu a     . 
 
It should be clear that the market solution, not even with complete information, will 
attain the full information cooperative outcome (denoted M for monopoly, for which 
 
1 M 2 x  u  
     ) where joint profits are maximized under full 
information. This is so since the market solution does not internalize the payoff 
externalities and therefore if  0     it will produce an expected output 
  
1 * Ex  
    which is too high (low) with strategic substitutes (complements) 
in relation to the optimal 
1 M Ex  2 
     . Furthermore, the market solution 
does not internalize the information externalities. At the internal team (IT) benchmark, 
joint profits are maximized and information externalities internalized with 
decentralized strategies.13 The question is whether the market solution allocates the 
correct weights (from the players’ collective welfare viewpoint) to private and public 
information. We show that the answer to this question is qualitatively similar to the 
one derived when analyzing the total surplus team benchmark. 
 
As before, it can be seen that the internal team-efficient solution minimizes, over the 
restricted strategies, the expected loss L with respect to the full information 
cooperative outcome 
M x , and that  
                                                 
13 Indeed,  when  0   there are no externalities (payoff or informational) and the internal team and 
market solutions coincide. 
  23   
2 2 M L2 i Exx Exx           
 2 . 
The first term in the sum corresponds to allocative inefficiency in the average 
quantity, which is proportional to   





, and the second term to productive 
inefficiency, which is proportional to        .   
 
It can checked that the form of the internal optimal team strategy is 
        
1 1| ii x ps E z    
      where   a      (while at the market 
solution we have that  a    ). The loss at any candidate internal team solution 
(which internalizes the payoff externality and for which    
1 2  Ex  
   ) will 
depend only on the response to private information a since at this candidate solution 
we have       
2 2 M Exx a
2 12           
  and  
2 2
i Exx a      
a
. 
This yields a strictly convex L as a function of a . As before, changing   has opposite 
effects on both sources of the loss. Now the internal team solution optimally trades off 
the sources of the loss with respect to the responsiveness to private information 
among decentralized strategies which internalize payoff externalities. 
 
In this case at the market solution there is both an information (IE) and a payoff (PE) 
externality, even with full information the market solution is not efficient (i.e. 
cooperative). The impact of the externalities on the response to private information 
can be assessed similarly as before. The market takes the public statistic z or  p  as 
given while the internal team solution takes into account both the impact on public 
informativeness (IE) and on payoffs (PE): 
 













Ep M C x
aa
xz





         
          
   
     
   




   
 
 
  24The market term is null at the market solution and the sum of the IE and PE terms can 
be evaluated as follows: 

















It is worth noting that while, as before,      sgn IE sgn * c   we have that   
    sgn PE sgn    since 
2 2 *1 c   0   , and therefore the PE term will call for a 
lower (higher) response to private information with strategic substitutes 
(complements) than the market solution. If  0    there is adverse selection and a high 
price indicates high costs. If, say, costs are high ( 0    ) then an increase in   
will increase 
a









  since at the market solution 
11 c  ) while  i x    will tend to be low (since at the market solution 
  
2
i       10 c   Ex  a  ). This means that if  0   , PE 0   and   must be 
reduced. Similarly, we have that  if 
a
PE 0  0   . The results on PE are in line with 
the results obtained by Angeletos and Pavan (Section 6.5, 2007) with exogenous 
public signals (and therefore no information externality).14 We will see how the effect 
of the informational externality term may overturn this result when  .                            0 c 
 
The next proposition characterizes the response to private information. 
 
Proposition 5. Let 0   
0 
. Then the internal team problem has a unique solution with 
, and  
1 IT a 
        
2 IT 2 2 sgn * sgn * * 1 aa c c         . 
 
If   then  *0 c     
IT sgn * sgn aa  
0
. Therefore, as before, under strategic 
complements (   ), there is too little response to private information,  . 
Indeed, the characterization yields the same qualitative result as in the previous 
section if  : too much or too little response to private information in the presence 
of (respectively) strategic substitutability or strategic complementarity. In this case, 
however, if agents use Cournot strategies (i.e., if
IT * aa 
* c  0
*0 c  ) then the market is not 
                                                 
14   Note also that in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) there is no noise in the payoff function while there is 
in our case. 
  25internal team–efficient. This should not be surprising when one considers that, when 
, there is no information externality yet the payoff externality is not internalized, 
as agents set a quantity that is too large (small) under strategic substitutability 
(complementarity). If 
*0 c 
0    and  *0 c  , then  
2 22 ** 1 cc     0    for   
close to zero or sufficiently negative (
* c





22 ** 1    0  

 and  . With strategic substitutes the 
market will bias the solution more towards putting too high a weight on private 





2 22 1 0     *0 c   even if  . 
 
This is the same qualitative result concerning the response to private information as 
derived previously using the total surplus team benchmark—with the following 
proviso: when  *0 c  , it need not be the case that there is too little response to private 
information. 
 
Remark 4. The weights to private information in the internal team and market 
solutions are, respectively,   a  
IT IT  and * * a    . It is easy to see that for 
u  small enough (and  ) we have that 
IT *    0    . The same result applies when 
0  
IT
 and    in which case   and  therefore  
2 

2 ** cc   
**
2 0  1  
IT * aa 
.       
 
 
6. Other interpretations of the model and applications. 
In this section we extend the interpretation of the model to other applications. 
 
6.1  Investment complementarities. In this case,  0     and we have strategic 
complementarity among investment decisions of the agents. The marginal benefit of 
investing is p ux     , and the cost is   
2 2 x () ii x   i Cx . The shock to the 
marginal benefit ( ) can be understood as a shock to demand, while the shock to 
costs (
u
 ) can be viewed as a productivity shock. Agents condition their decisions on 
the marginal benefit of investment p , derived, for example, from the public signals 
  26on macroeconomic data released by the government (which in turn depend on the 
aggregate activity level). This description need not be taken literally and is simply 
meant to capture the reduced form of a dynamic process. For example, consider 
competitive firms deciding about investment in the presence of macroeconomic 
uncertainty as represented by the random variable  , which affects profitability. In 
predicting  ,eachfirm has access to a private signal as well as to public information, 
consisting of aggregate past investment figures compiled by a government agency. 
Data on aggregate investment incorporates measurement error and, at each period, a 
noisy measure of the previous period’s aggregate investment is made public. 15 
Proposition 4 indicates then that at the market solution agents respond too little to 
private information. This result is in line with the case of exogenous public 
information (Angeletos and Pavan, section 6.2, 2007).  This should be not surprisingly 
since the informational and the scarcity index role of the public statistic are aligned in 
this case.                                                                                                                                                          
 
6.2  Monopolistic competition. The model applies also to a monopolistically 
competitive market with quantity-setting firms; in this case, either  0    (goods are 
substitutes) or  0    (goods are complements). Firm i faces the inverse demand for 
its product,   2 ii p ux x       , and has costs  i x  . Each firm uses a supply 
function that is contingent on its own price:    i , i X sp for firm  . It follows then that 
observing the price 
i
i p   is informationally equivalent (for firm i ) to observing 
p ux     . 
 
Under monopolistic competition, the total surplus function (consistent with the 
differentiated demand system) is slightly different: 
   
1 22
0 TS 2 i uxx x d i      
        
2   . 
Here the market is not efficient under complete information because price is not equal 
to marginal cost. Each firm has some residual market power. The results of Section 4 
do not apply but those of Section 5 apply when firms collude. It is interesting to note 
                                          
15  For example, quarterly data on national accounts are subject to measurement error. Rodríguez-
Mora and Schulstad (2007) show how government announcements regarding GNP growth affect 
growth via aggregate investment. 
  27then that, if agents cannot use contingent strategies and there is no information 
externality issue (as in, e.g., cases of Cournot or Bertrand competition), Angeletos and 
Pavan (section 6.5, 2007) argue that the strategic complementarity case would exhibit 
excessive response to private information (the opposite of what occurs with 
endogenous public information) and that strategic substitutability would exhibit 
insufficient response to private information (in contrast with the case for endogenous 
public information, where either excessive or insufficient response to private 
information is possible). 
 
6.3 Demand schedule competition. Let a buyer of a homogenous good with unknown 
ex post value   face an inverse supply p uy     , where 
1
0 i y yd i    and  i y  is 
the demand of buyer  . The buyer’s net benefit is given by  i    2
2
i i i p yy     , 
where 
2
i y   is a transaction or opportunity cost (or an adjustment for risk aversion). 
The model fits this setup if we let  ii y x   . Some examples follow. 
 
Firms purchasing labor. A firm purchases labor whose productivity   is unknown—
say, because of technological uncertainty—and faces an inverse linear labor supply 
(with 0   ) and quadratic adjustment costs in the labor stock. The firm has a private 
assessment of the productivity of labor, and inverse supply is subject to a shock. In 
particular, the welfare analysis of Section 4 applies letting  ii y x   .  
 
Traders in a financial market. Traders compete in demand schedules for a risky asset 
with liquidation value    and face a quadratic adjustment cost in their position 
(alternatively, the parameter    proxies for risk aversion). Each trader receives a 
private signal about the liquidation value of the asset. There are also behavioral 
traders: those who trade according to the elastic aggregate demand  up   , 
where u  is random. When  0   , the behavioral agents are “value” traders who buy 
(sell) when the price is low (high). When  0   , the behavioral agents are 
“momentum” traders who buy (sell) when the price is high (low).16 Our inverse 
                                                 
16  Gennotte and Leland (1990) interpret the case  0    as program traders following a portfolio 
insurance strategy. Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2009) study empirical returns of value and 
  28supply follows from the market-clearing equation. It is worth noting that behavioral 
value (momentum) traders induce strategic substitutability (complementarity) in the 
actions of informed traders. 
 
In the financial market interpretation of the model, if momentum traders predominate 
(0   ) then the slope of excess demand   
1 ˆ ´ 
 c     is positive. Less price-
sensitive “momentum” traders (a more negative  ) decreases the weight given to the 
private information of rational traders, and increases the informativeness of prices: 
22
u a      (increasing    increases  ). Less price-sensitive “momentum” 




  since then market depth is 
increasing with  . If “value” traders predominate ( 0   ) then less price sensitivity 
(higher  ) decreases complementarity and, as before, decreases the weight given to 
the private information of rational traders while increasing the informativeness of 
prices. 
 
If the behavioral traders are momentum traders ( 0   ), then prices always contain 
too little information (from the collective viewpoint of informed traders). If the 
behavioral traders are value traders ( 0   ) then the opposite occurs in the usual case 
of downward-sloping demand schedules for informed traders, which obtain when the 
volume of behavioral trading is large (low  u  ). When the volume generated by 
behavioral traders is small (high  u  ), demand schedules are upward sloping and prices 
may contain too little information. This happens for intermediate values of  u   within 
its high-value region. 
 
Asset auctions. Consider the auction of a financial asset for which (inverse) supply is 
price elastic:  ˆ p y     with  0   , where ˆ y is the total quantity bid. The 
liquidation value   of the asset may be its value in the secondary market (say, for a 
central bank liquidity or Treasury auction). The marginal valuation of a bidder is 
                                                                                                                                            
momentum strategies. Hendershott and Seasholes (2009) find that program trading accounts for 
almost 14% of the average daily market volume at the NYSE in 1999-2005 and that program 
traders lose money on average. See Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a survey of behavioral biases. 
  29decreasing in the amount bid.17 Each bidder receives a private signal about  , and 
there are noncompetitive bidders who bid according to u  . This setup yields 
ˆ y yu    , where y is the aggregate of competitive (informed) bids, and an 
effective inverse supply for the competitive bidders: 





From the collective viewpoint of competitive bidders prices contain too much 
information in the usual case of downward-sloping demand schedules, which obtain 
when the volume of noncompetitive bidding is large (low  ). When the volume 
generated by noncompetitive bids is small (high  u  ), demand schedules are again 
upward sloping and prices may contain too little information for intermediate values 
of  u   within its high-value region. 
 
Double auction with noise traders. The model can also accommodate, as a limit case 
of the example just given, a double auction with noise traders demanding a random 
amount  . Suppose that noise traders bid  u   ˆ up    with  ˆ uu   . Then 
 as  
1 up  
  u  , and market clearing yields uy0    . It is then 
immediate from Proposition 1 that, in the limit as  ,  
1 12
u aa      
    , 
, and c . In this case, equilibrium schedules always have 
their natural (“right”) slope. Given a diffuse prior (







   
0    ), we have   and the 
equilibrium strategy is 
ˆ ca 
   , ii X sp a ps   , with trader i  supplying or demanding 
according as the price is (respectively) larger or smaller than the private signal. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks. 
Rational expectations equilibria (linear Bayesian equilibria) are not total surplus 
team–efficient even when the allowed allocations share certain properties with the 
market equilibrium (i.e., both are linear in information). The reason is that, in general, 
the market does not internalize the informational externality when prices convey 
information. The result is that the market does not trade off optimally non-
                                                 
17  A justification for the case of liquidity auctions is given in Ewerhart, Cassola, and Valla (2009). 
  30fundamental price volatility with the dispersion of individual actions. Only in 
exceptional circumstances (i.e., when the information externality vanishes) does the 
market get it right and strikes the optimal trade off between volatility and dispersion. 
Under strategic substitutability, prices will tend to convey too little information when 
the informational role of prices prevails over its index-of-scarcity role, or will convey 
too much information in the opposite case. Under strategic complementarity, such as 
in the presence of a network good, prices always convey too little information. The 
inefficiency of the market solution opens the door to the possibility that more precise 
public or private information will lead to an increased welfare loss. This is the case 
when the market already calls for a too large response to private information, then 
more precise private information exacerbates the problem. 
 
These results extend to the internal team benchmark, in which the players’ collective 
welfare is taken into account, as long as the index-of-scarcity role of prices prevails 
over their informational role. When this is not the case, the amount of information in 
prices may be above or below the welfare benchmark. It follows that received results 
on the optimal relative weights to be placed on private and public information (when 
the latter is exogenous) may be overturned when the informational role of the price 
conflicts with its index of scarcity role and the former is important enough. 
 
Several extensions are worth considering. Examples include exploring tax-subsidy 
schemes to implement team-efficient solutions along the lines of Angeletos and Pavan 
(2009); and studying incentives to acquire information (as in Vives 1988; Burguet and 
Vives 2000; Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009; Myatt and Wallace 2012; Llosa and 
Venkateswaran 2012; Colombo et al. 2012 ). 
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Proof of Proposition 1: From the posited strategy    , ii X sz ba s c z   , where 
zu a     and 1 0 c    , we obtain that    1 p bc z     . From the first-
order condition for player   we have  i
    
1 ,1 ii , X sz b c zE sz   
         . 
Here       1 ii E| s , z s E| z      with  
1
   
  ,   
1
u E| z az   
   
(recall that we have normalized  0   ), and 
22 a  u       from the projection 
theorem for Gaussian random variables. Note that    ii , z sh z E| s    where 

1
u ha   


























It follows that the equilibrium parameter a is determined as the unique (real), of the 
following cubic equations, that is positive and lies in the interval 
:   













    or       0 uaa       











It is immediate from the preceding equality for c that  
1 c  
   (since  ) and 
that 1
0 a 













It follows that 
  ˆ ˆ , ii X sp ba s c p  , 
  32where   ˆ ˆ 1 bb c  ,  ( b )    , and    ˆ 1 cc c   with  ˆ 1 c 0    . From the 
equilibrium expression for    
1 21 1 u c  a     
     we obtain the expression for 

1 1 ˆ cc 
  .  
 
Claim 1.  Linear equilibria in strategies with bounded means and with uniformly 
(across players) bounded variances yield linear equilibria of the schedule game for 
which the public statistic function is of type    , u  . 
 
Proof: If for player i we posit the strategy 
ˆ ˆ iii i i x bc pa s    
then the aggregate action is given by 
11
00
ˆˆ ˆˆ ii i x xd i b c p a a d i b c p a            , 




i bb d  i
1
0 ˆˆ i cc d  i i
1
0 i aa d    (assuming that all terms are well-
defined). Observe that, according to our convention on the average error terms of the 
signals,   a.s. provided that 
1
0 ii ad i    0 var ii a      is uniformly bounded across agents 
(since 
2 var i      
i a
, it is enough that   be uniformly bounded). In equilibrium, this 
will be the case. Therefore, if we restrict attention to candidate linear equilibria with 
parameters   uniformly bounded in i and with well-defined average parameters   
and  , then 
i a
ˆ b
ˆ c ˆ ˆ x bc pa    
 u
  and the public statistic function is of the type 
.    ,  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) From the equation determining the responsiveness to 
private information a ,   
23 1 0 uaa       
    , it is immediate that a 
decreases with  u  ,    , 
2  and   , that a increases with    . Note that 
    sgn s a gn      . As  u  ranges from 0 to ∞,   decreases  from 




    
   
 
  33(ii) As  u  ranges from 0 to ∞, the responsiveness to public information c goes from 

1   
  to   (resp.  ) if    0    (resp.  0   ). The result follows since, in 
equilibrium, 
 









      
 
          
 
and   as  0 a  u  . It follows that      sgn sgn u c       because  0 u a   . 
Similarly, from the first part of the expression for c we have      sgn sgn c      
















     
   
      
   





















 2      
  
 










Hence we conclude that       




1 1 ˆ cc 
  , it follows that   goes from  ˆ c
1 
  to 
1 
   as  u   ranges from 0 to ∞,18 
      ˆˆ sgn sgn sgn u cc           , and      ˆ sgn s c gn c        . It is then 
immediate that  ˆ 1 c    is decreasing in  u   and increasing in    . 
 
(iii) Price informativeness 
22
u a      is increasing in     (since a increases with 
  ) and also in  u   (since  
1 a  
1   
    and   decreases  with  a u  ). Using the 














    
   

       
  
   
   
 




18  Note that if  0    and  0    then 
11  
   . 













    2
a   
   
  
            
, 
and therefore       sgn sgn     . 
(iv) From 
1 , ii x pE s z 





i   
    
   and, noting that  a      we conclude that 

2 22
i Exx a     
a
. The results then follow from the comparative statics results for 
 in (i). 
 
Claim 2.     ii E| s , z sh z     with 
12
u ha   
  ,  0 h     ,  0 u h     and 
    sgn sgn h    . 
 
Proof: From  
1
u ha   
 
2 a
in the proof of Proposition 1 it is immediate that 
1
u h   
  . We have that  0 h      since  0 a     ;  0 u h     since 
0 u    and therefore  
2 0 uu a    . Finally, we have that in equilibrium 












    
      
 
      
, 
and from    
1 1 ch  
     we can obtain   0 h    , and therefore, 
    sgn h sgn     .  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Note first that   
22 TS 0 Eb   and   
22 TS 0 Ec    
whenever 0   . Given that  1 i x b  , and  i x cz   , we can optimize with 
respect to b and   to obtain  c
   
  
TS
 MC     0,
TS










    

      
 
where  p ux      and   MC ii x x   

. The constraint   is 
equivalent to 
 MC 0 i Ep x   
   b     and      MC i Ep xz  0      is equivalent to 
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







. Those constraints are also fulfilled by the market 
solution since the first-order condition (FOC) for player  is  i  MC , 0 ii Ep xsz    
  
, 
from which it follows, according to the properties of Gaussian distributions, that   
, and   MC 0 i Ep x        MC 0 i Ep x  z       (as well as 
).     MC ii Ep xs    0

 
It follows that the form of the team optimal strategy is 
   1|
1
ii x ps 
  Ez      a     where  . We have that  
       |  
1 1 x p  
    E        z  1





   we  obtain       
2 2 o Exx a
2 1        
  . We know 
that  
2 2
i Exx a       .  
 
Let     W  Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 3 in Vives (2011) 
we can obtain, using an exact Taylor expansion of total surplus around the full 
information first best allocation 
L TS TS
o EE    .
o x ,  that 
    
2 o Exx      




















, which is easily seen strictly convex in a 
and with a unique solution  . (Note that 
1 0
T a 
  a    is dominated by a
1 
 
 0  
 
and that   is dominated by  . Furthermore, it is immediate that WL
 
and therefore   at the solution.) 
0 a 
a
0 a  0
0 
 
The impact of a  on    TS E  is easily characterized (noting that    TS 0 Ec    and 
therefore disregarding the indirect impact of a on    TS E  via  a change in c):  
  36     










Ep x Ep x
aa
Ep x sc 




       
  
    
 
 given that   ct. ii x z as    ,  i x zc   and  za   . 
 
Evaluating    TS E  a    at the LE, where      MC 0 ii Ep xs     , we obtain that 
    TS MC i Ea c E px           . Now, because 
          MC MC MC 0 ii i ii Ep xs Ep x Ep x             , 
it follows that 







Ep x Ep x
Ex E x a 

    
      
          
 
since  i   is independent of all the model’s other random variables and since   
when 
LE 0 a 
0    . Hence 
    
*
TS







        
, 
and this equals    sgn *
T aa   because    TS E   is single-peaked for   with  a 




Proof of Proposition 4. The welfare loss at the team-efficient solution is given by 
, which is decreasing in  
T WL a    , u   and     since   is decreasing in  WL   , u   and 
   for a  given a and   
T WL' a 0  . With respect to the market solution we have that 


















 and   solves   a*  
23 1 0 uaa       
    . 
 











    
 
 
    
, 







  if and only if  
22 2 u a 





which is always true since 2 0   .  Exactly the same condition  holds for 
 WL * 0 u da d   . Furthermore, we can show that    WL * 0 da d    if and only if 




   
            . It follows that   will be increasing in  WL
   for     and       or  u   small enough.  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: It proceeds in a parallel way to the proof of Proposition 3. 
Note first that   
22 0 i Eb     and   
22 0 i Ec    whenever  2 0   . Given 
that    C ii i pxx   ,  p ux     ,  1 i x b   , and  i x cx c z      and 
px       we can optimize with respect to b and   to obtain  c
   
  
MC    0,
















    

     
 
where   MC ii x x    . The constraint      MC    0 ii Ep x x       is equivalent 
to      2 b    ; we can also check that      MC Ep xz    0 ii x z      is 
equivalent to  , where   a
IT cc 












    and     
22
ua      . 
 
Note that due to payoff externalities ( px      ) the expressions for   and for c 
are different than in the market solution. It follows that the form of the internal team 
optimal strategy is 
b
      
1 1| ii x ps Ez    
          where   a     . 
We have that        
1 1| x p     
 E z         

 and  that 
   
M 1| xx E 2 z           and,  since    var z  
1 
     we  obtain 
      
2 2 2 M 12 Exx a           
 . We have that  
2
x
2 a i Ex       .  
  38Let    
M L i EE i     
 
. Similarly as before we can obtain that 
 
2 M Exx      


















which is easily seen strictly convex in a   and with a unique solution 
. (Note that  
1 IT 0 a 
  
1 a 
    is dominated by  
1 a  
 
 L0 
 and that 
  is dominated by  . Furthermore, it is immediate that 
 
and 
therefore   at the solution.) 
0 a 
0 a 
0 a  0 
 
The impact of a  on    i E   is easily characterized (noting that    0 i Ec     and 
therefore disregarding the indirect impact of a on    i E   via  a change in c):  
 
   
 






















Ep x sc c x

   
          
        
  
    









given that   ct. ii z x as    ,  i x zc   ,  za   ,  px      and 
 1 xa c       . Evaluating    i E  a     at the equilibrium, where 
, we obtain    MC 0 ii Ep xs     









        
. 
  39As in the last section, we have      
2 MC 0 i Ep x a          and, recalling that 
0   , it is easily checked that     
2 1 i Ex a c      . At the equilibrium we have 
therefore19 
   











Since    i E  is single-peaked for    and has a unique maximum at   and 
, it follows that 
0 a 
IT 0 a 
* a  0
     
2 IT 2 2
*








   

           
. 
 
                                                 
19   Note also that at the equilibrium  10 c   .  
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